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Enthused by China’s conversion to the free market system in 1978 and its adoption of 
Western-style market institutions, the world has spent the last few decades turning a blind eye 
to China’s real “governance” problem: that a shadow Party-State system permeates all 
branches of the economy.1  Whatever Washington-consensus style institutions are put in 
place, whatever State Owned Enterprise (“SOE”) reform is introduced, corporate and market 
governance occur under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).  And the CCP’s 
guidebook is the Leninist command that the whole of society shall be run as “single country-
wide State syndicate”.2 
 
This paper contends that China’s syndicated economic organization creates conditions that are 
conducive to antitrust problems and to which the Western world must awaken.  Of course, a 
conventional antitrust eye will immediately make the case that low-priced Chinese imports 
have introduced intense competition into Western markets.  But those positive surges of 
competition coincide with two negative predicaments.  First, worrying parallels can be drawn 
between the conduct of Chinese firms and the maladies that led the US Congress to adopt 
antitrust rules in the late XIXth century: rampant industry coordination, rapacious M&A, and 
the perversion of democratic institutions.  Chinese firms collectively can be considered to 
constitute a “supertrust” of a kind that Rockefeller and Carnegie would have recognized, 
indeed envied.  Second, the unrestricted operation of the CCP in Western markets – together 
with the unilateral protection of its home market – sap Western societies’ trust in competitive 
markets.  The point here is not that there is an “unlevel playing field” between Western and 
Chinese investors.3  Instead, the point is that our elites’ silent acceptance of the CCP-led 
syndicate as a global business partner may deal a lethal blow to already damaged public 
confidence in the free competition and free trade agenda.  These two concerns, and in 
particular the latter, compel an antitrust awakening in the Western world. 
 
The West has not identified this problem to date, trusting that indigenous market governance 
institutions modeled on international best practices would cure those (infantile) diseases.  A 
Chinese domestic antitrust law was adopted in 2007 and State agencies were given drastic 
enforcement powers.4  Since 2009, discussions have taken place in international circles on the 
distortions of competition caused by Chinese State Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) and on the 
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necessity of competitive neutrality.5  Across the world, delegation, forbearance and optimism 
have guided the Western world’s policy vis-a-vis China. 
 
This policy stance is no longer tenable.  The CCP/SOE problem calls for urgent remediation 
by the US and the EU.  First, because the ongoing mega-wave of Chinese M&A on global 
markets risks placing the CCP in command of sizeable Western assets.6  Much like a Trojan 
horse, China’s Leninist economic governance is infiltrating the daily lives of Western 




Second, because the problem is not transitional.  As China specialist Frank Pieke wrote in his 
insightful book ‘The Good Communist’ published in 2009, the prospect that domestic 
prosperity will bring about democratic transition in China is no longer realistic.7   
   
Tools exist.  The antitrust laws of the US and the European Union (“EU”) embody safeguards 
to address the CCP/SOE problem.  The EU has recently introduced revisions to its traditional 
approach.  The US has so far only voiced security concerns through the Committee on 
Foreign Investments (“CFIUS”).8  This paper argues that the US could usefully draw 
inspiration from the EU and hone its antitrust powers against China. 
 
To show this, the paper is organized as follows.  First, I explain that Chinese firms 
organizationally operate as a CCP-led syndicate, which seems analogous to a “trust”, 
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“combination” or “concerted practice” within the generic meaning of US and EU antitrust 
laws. On occasion I refer to this syndicate as a “supertrust”, using the two terms 
interchangeably.  Second, I advance that this CCP-led syndicate generates concerns similar to 
those that fueled social demand for antitrust regulation in the XIXth century.  Third, I lay 
down the moral imperative for antitrust scrutiny of this CCP-led syndicate.  Fourth, I discuss 
why the Western world cannot forbear and outsource the resolution of this problem to 
Chinese market governance institutions.  Fifth, I show that existing antitrust rules provide a 
suitable remedy, and that the US should emulate the EU’s recent antitrust awakening vis-a-vis 
China. 
 
Prior to examining those issues, some caveats are in order.  This paper is not the first to look 
into China’s politicized corporate governance system.  Many studies consider the role of the 
Chinese State as a corporate holding entity, and refer to it as “China Inc.”9  Those studies 
focus in particular on the oversight of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (“SASAC”) over SOEs.  This paper is distinct on two counts.  
To start, it does not center so much on ownership by the State, but instead seeks to discuss its 
political influence through party links.  Moreover, given the breadth of the Chinese corporate 
sector, it is more realistic to describe it as a syndicated organization rather than as an 
integrated firm (“one big factory”).10  This is also conceptually more consistent with reported 
episodes of fierce competition amongst Chinese firms,11 which could not plausibly occur in a 
one firm scenario but which is perfectly compatible with a coordination scenario.12 
 
Second, I should note that I have never had the opportunity to go to China.  My lack of 
exposure to the “China Model” may admittedly affect the authority of my thesis.  But I do not 
think that this disqualifies me from writing a paper on China’s economic governance.  In 
writing this policy paper, I have followed the conventional standards of objectivity, 
thoroughness and robustness that are applicable to scholarly work.  And I would add that my 
lack of previous or ongoing dealings with China presents advantage of removing any conflict 
of interest, a factor which may have generated a degree of self-censorship in some Western 
research on China.13 
 
I. THE LENINIST SYNDICATE 
 
Lenin once prophesized that the Soviet economy should be run as a “single country-wide 
State syndicate”.14  As a Leninist economy, China has scrupulously followed this guideline.  
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A fact little known by Westerners is that a CCP cell is embedded in each Chinese SOE,15 a 
requirement of Chinese law.16 
 
Party cells can be best understood as tentacles of the CCP.17  Their best documented role 
concerns human resources and in particular the appointment and career management of senior 
executives.  In addition, Party cells have a less conspicuous say on all “important and material 
matters” of corporate policy.18  In an insightful academic article, Jiangyu Wang, an Associate 
Professor with the National University of Singapore, sheds light on the opaque functions 
discharged by Party cells.  The abstract concept of “important matters” covers development 
strategy, production and business operation policies, annual budget, etc.19  Wang also explains 
that CCP internal directives require SOEs to ensure effective participation of Party cells in 
decision-making, including decisions by the board of directors, supervisory board and 
management team.20  This role includes educational tasks.  In May 2015, it was officially 
reported on ChemChina’s website that its President Ren Jianxin had officially “followed the 
instructions of [...] the ChemChina Party committee to carry out a special Party principle 
lecture on clean acts and practical work”. A total of “356 people attended the lecture, 
including ChemChina’s leadership, heads of its departments and subsidiaries, as well as 
science worker representatives”.21  Last, Party cells must report to the CCP “anything 
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materially inconsistent with the Party’s line or policies, state laws, or anything that is divorced 
from reality”.  All in all, Wang concludes that the combined effect of those prerogatives is to 
“make the SOE an economic entity almost completely controlled by the CCP”.22 
 
Hard empirical evidence of the CCP’s grip on SOEs does not exist.  Non-disclosure of the 
Party’s influence in SOE governance and of managers’ political connections is a policy 
choice.23  Moreover, the secrecy surrounding the CCP’s role in corporate governance occurs 
with the complicity of many occidental observers: investment bankers, law firms and 
consultants have incentives to paint an attractive picture of SOEs to foreign investors.24  Last, 
self-censorship by Western academics exposed to potential visa denial or the loss of Chinese 
students’ fees in university education programs appears to be widespread.25   
 
Journalists seem to have fewer constraints.  In his 2010 book, The Party: The Secret World of 
China’s Communist Rulers, former Financial Times China Bureau Chief Richard McGregor 
documents anecdotes of the Party’s role in business.  He talks of the 4 digit “red machine” 
that sits on the desk of CEOs of State companies and that serves as the CCP “hotline”.  He 
recounts the testimony of a Chinese lawyer: “in corporate law, the boards [of Chinese state 
companies] can choose to disregard the Party’s advice. As a fact of life, they cannot”.26  
McGregor also relates telling stories.  He writes that in 2005, the true reason for the failure of 
China’s CNOOC bid for US Unocal was due to the way that CNOOC’s chief executive, Fu 
Chengyu, mismanaged the competing demands of the CCP and the independent foreign 
directors of CNOOC’s board in configuring the bid.  Similarly, McGregor explains in minute 
detail how, in 2007-2008, the Politburo of the CCP orchestrated Chinalco’s counter bid for 
Rio Tinto, which included directly influencing the company’s chairman Xiao Yaqing, who is 
now Chairman of SASAC (and who had been parachuted into a CCP position following his 
departure from Chinalco).27  
 
Importantly, CCP control extends beyond SOEs.  Privately-owned enterprises (“POEs”) are 
also subject to CCP supervision, through classic Soviet-style arrangements.  Placement of 
Party cadres is one of them.  CCP policy dictates that a corporate manager of a given rank 
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typically simultaneously holds a position of equivalent rank in the Party system.  Milhaupt 
and Zheng find that in “ninety-five out of the top one hundred private firms and eight out of 
the top ten Internet firms the founder or de facto controller is currently or formerly a member 
of central or local Party-state organizations such as People’s Congresses and People’s 
Political Consultative Conferences”.28  Extralegal means, like the setting up of Government-
engineered trade associations, industry alliances, and chambers of commerce, are another 
such Soviet-style arrangement.29   
 
If all of the above is true, then the Chinese economic system can be organizationally 
conceptualized as a “combination in the form of trust or otherwise” within the meaning of 
Section 1 of the US Sherman Act or as a “concerted practice” or “association of undertakings” 
within the meaning of Article 101 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (“TFEU”).  
Though their research relates to Chinese corporate governance, Lin and Milhaupt actually 
come very close to attaching this “trust” label to China’s economic organization when they 
write that “Chinese state capitalism of the past thirty years represents a form of industrial 
organization that produces substantial benefits to members of the encompassing coalition— 
the managerial elite with control over economic policy formation and implementation within 
the party-state system”.30 
 
Indeed, given its vast scale and ambition, one can characterize the Chinese economic system 
as a supertrust.  It creates backchannels between SOEs and POEs within a given industry.  But 
at the CCP central level, it enmeshes all SOEs and POEs, regardless of whether they compete 
in the same business area.31  This goes far, far beyond anything the US industrialists of yore 
ever conceived.32   
 
II. GRASSROOTS ANTITRUST  
 
Ernest Geelhorn and Bill Kovacic have conceptualized the three concerns that fueled social 
demand for antitrust regulation in the United States in the late XIXth century:33 the 
endangering of democratic institutions, predatory tactics for subduing rivals, and outrageous 
methods to achieve unreasonable ends beyond destroying competitors.34  In many respects, the 
CCP-led syndicate’s operation raises similar concerns. 
 
The danger posed to democratic institutions is perhaps the easiest to understand.35  The 
syndicated organization of China provides it with hard power over foreign affairs.  As much 
as John Rockefeller could steer lawmaking to his benefit with threats of exorbitantly priced 
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103 Geo. L.J. 665. 
29
 Id.  
30
 Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, “We Are The (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of 
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oil, the CCP can use its leverage over the “workshop of the world” to blackmail 
governmental, non-governmental and international organizations.36  Our global leaders’ 
deafening silence on Chinese political and human rights issues lends empirical support to this 
argument.  But this is not all.  The syndicate exerts “soft power” in third countries, through 
the CCP cells embedded in overseas Chinese companies.  Where there are Chinese firms, one 
can safely assume that there are Party organizations and Party activities.37  And it is well-
known that the CCP “has always accepted that [...] people must be indoctrinated”, including 
outside of China.38 
 
Second, the rapacious anticompetitive tactics of old-style US trusts seem to have time-
travelled to contemporary China.  Much as in the 1911 Standard Oil Co. of NJ v United States 
case where Rockefeller leveraged preferential railroads rebates to subdue rivals,39 Chinese 
firms compete on an unequal footing with international competitors thanks to concessionary 
credit provided by comrade financial institutions.40  Likewise, the tobacco trust’s brute force 
acquisition and shutdown of 30 rival plants in the 1911 United States v American Tobacco 
case resonates when one pauses to reflect on the implications of the ongoing wave of foreign 
acquisitions by Chinese firms.41  The parallels with the behavior of the XIXth century robber 
barons are even stronger if one considers the sectors besieged by overcapacity, such as steel42 
or fragmented industries such as travel services.43 
 
Last, if odious conduct was a distinctive trait of the classic US trusts, this too could be second 
nature for the Chinese supertrust.  Compare Gellhorn and Kovacic’s description of the 
ruthless XIXth century US economic landscape (“investors were defrauded by watered stocks; 
workers were discarded as worn out tools …; liberty was endangered by bribery of public 
officials …”)44 with contemporary reports on China (“China’s rampant theft of intellectual 
                                                 
36
 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global, at p. 158. 
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 Id. p. 188: “Chinese companies are politicized. That is, many have Communist Party cells, secretaries, and 
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into shape, Financial Times, March 8, 2016, Henny Sender, reporting that the acquisition of Syngenta by 
ChemChina is supported by a loan from a small mainland bank, Citic, all this being engineered through political 
connections at the highest level. 
41
 See “China’s buying up foreign companies, so the U.S. might need to rethink its trade strategy”, The 
Washington Post, April 3, 2016, Editorial Board, which suggests that acquisitions are the first step of a strategy 
to develop domestic capability, and then block imports from the Western world. 
42
 See China’s State-owned zombie economy, Financial Times, February 29, 2016, Gabriel Wildau. 
43
 See Chinese travel giants HKCTS Group, CITS Group mull merger to create largest travel service company in 
Asia, subject to approvals, MLex, February 24, 2016, reporting that China National Travel Service (HK) Group 
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property”;45  “China’s counterfeit culture runs deep”;46  “China has deployed [...] forced 
technology transfer [and] manipulative standard setting”).47  Can all of this be blamed on the 
Chinese supertrust?  That would be excessive.  That said, a number of China specialists 
observe that members of the syndicate are the beneficiaries of such extractive maneuvers.  
Chinese state-owned steel producers Baosteel Group and the Hebei Group were suspected of 
being the primary beneficiaries of recent cyber theft attacks against US Steel.48  And the 
recent shutdown in China of Apple’s iBook Stores and iTunes Movies has in part been driven 
by favoritism for indigenous rivals such as Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent.49  
 
III. MORAL IMPERATIVE 
 
The moral case for an antitrust reaction is easier to lay out.  In recent years, public confidence 
in open markets that bring in foreign competition has been fraying at the seams.  The growing 
opposition to ongoing trade partnership negotiations in the West is a visible symptom of this.  
The increasing political clout of anti-establishment and populist parties with anti-free trade 
agendas is another indicator of the public’s diminishing confidence in open markets. 
 
Chinese competition in Western markets has likely meant distortions in the level playing 
field, engineered by systemic subsidization, currency manipulation and extractive labor 
market relations.50 This has eroded the political capital of the West’s “open door” trade 
policies.  A widespread realization that doing business with China means opening the door to 
a syndicate of firms, coordinated backstage by the CCP, could be the final nail in the coffin 
for our current free trade system. 
 
The collateral damage of doing business with the Chinese supertrust could indeed fuel further 
demands for a blanket abandonment of free and competitive trade across the board, including 
with nations which, unlike China, do have effective market governance institutions.  This 
would in practice deny Western citizens the benefits of legitimate competitive imports. 
 
The risk of a backlash reinforces the pressing need for antitrust attention to the CCP-led 
supertrust, and may help forestall the emergence of an even greater anti-free trade platform 
than we presently observe.  After all, the core raison d'être of antitrust regimes is reflective of 
Western societies’ moral commitment to promote competition in all of its forms.  The 
objection that this is a trade issue is in our view irrelevant.  As George Stigler wrote in a paper 
titled “The Economists and the problem of monopoly”: “Free trade is a sort of international 
antimonopoly program in itself”.51 
 
IV. “POTEMKIN” INSTITUTIONS BY DESIGN 
                                                 
45
 David Shambaugh, China’s Future at p. 44.  Shambaugh also writes, in his book China Goes Global: The 
Partial Power, that “a variety of discriminatory trade and investment practices plague European (and other) 
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46
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John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009, p. 116 
47
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48
 U.S. Steel accuses China of Hacking, Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2016, J. Miller.  
49
 Apple no longer immune to China’s scrutiny of U.S. tech firms, New York Times, April 21, 2016, Paul Mozur 
& Jane Perlez. 
50
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To date, discontents with the Chinese supertrust have been told to channel their grievances 
through domestic market governance institutions.  Since Deng Xiao Ping’s ideological U-turn 
in 1978, China has progressively rolled out the basic legal infrastructure of a market 
economy: private property, freedom to compete, freedom to contract, a court system and the 
rule of law.  China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 prompted further adjustments geared to 
international best practice.52  As part of this “marketization” process, and following a 13 year 
genesis, China adopted a Western-spirited Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007,53 and vested 
enforcement powers in three agencies, namely the Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of 
China (“MOFCOM”), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) and 
the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”).54 
 
But does this market governance infrastructure provide an effective remedy? 
 
Since 2007, much ink has been spilt by academics and practitioners on the neutrality (or lack 
thereof) of Chinese antitrust enforcers in their application of Chinese competition law to 
foreign firms.55  Yet this debate invariably misses the point.  The Chinese enforcement system 
is broken by design.  Qianlan Wu (who stops short of reaching such a controversial 
conclusion) explains: “The Chinese market governance is subject to a monist regulatory 
framework where the party-state has remained to be [sic] a dominant, resilient and strategic 
actor”.56  He adds: “the CCP functions as a shadowing institution behind the state apparatus 
and directs decision making by these organs”.57 
 
A quick Internet search seems to corroborate this analysis.  MOFCOM Chairman Gao 
Hucheng, SAIC chief Zhang Mao, and NDRC Chairman Xu Shaoshi are all full members of 
the Central Committee of the CCP.58 And Xiao Yaqing, Chairman of SASAC, is a member of 
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which reports directly to the Politburo, the 
decision-making body of the CCP.59 
 
                                                 
52
 For a thorough review, see Qianlan Wu, Competition Laws, Globalization and Legal Pluralism, Hart 
Publishing, 2013 at Chapter 3. 
53
 Anti-Monopoly Law of the Republic of China, [2008] Presidential Order No. 68, August 30, 2007 (“AML”).  
The law is very close in wording to the EU competition rules, but also has specific language which reflects an 
ambition to promote the socialist market economy, and China’s specificities. See Qianlan Wu, supra at pp. 133.  
54
 MOFCOM carries out merger control, the NDRC enforces the AML against price related restraints of 
competition, and SAIC enforces the AML against non-price related anticompetitive practices.  Incremental 
progress towards a true competition culture is being pursued through participation in international networks of 
antitrust enforcers.   
55
 D. Daniel Sokol and Wentong Zheng, “FRAND (and Industrial Policy) in China”, Cambridge Handbook of 
Technical Standardization Law, Vol. 1: Antitrust and Patents, (2017) Forthcoming. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776235. Sokol and Wentong believe that industrial policy 
concerns may have influenced the Chinese agencies’ analysis in several high profile merger and monopolization 
cases involving large US technology firms. Others consider that the AML has not been enforced in a manner that 
discriminates against foreign companies. Wendy Ng, “Policy Objectives of Public Enforcement and the Anti-
Monopoly Law: An Assessment of the First Five Years” in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds), China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law, The First Five Years, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2013, p. 56. 
56








Source: R. McGregor's, The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers, 2010 
 
Moreover, the CCP’s influence diffuses top-down through decisional silos.  McGregor 
explains: “the officials working in public institutions are trained, and re-trained, at regular 
intervals, through the Party’s extensive nationwide network of 2,800 schools”.60  And in the 
judiciary, which is supposed to review antitrust enforcers’ decisions, the Party is also in the 
driver’s seat: “The Lawyer’s association, the Justice Bureau, and indeed any legal body … 
come under the control of the Politics and Law Committee” of the Politburo.61  In 2015, the 
US Department of State noted in its annual statement on the investment climate in China that: 
“Generally, unlike the United States, the legal system is designed to serve state and 
Communist Party interests, and as such, does not consistently protect individual rights or 
effectively resolve disputes”.62 
 
In scholarly circles, China’s antitrust institutional design has occasionally been criticized, in 
particular, its lack of agency and judicial independence from the executive branch.63  But our 
argument here is that the issue cuts far deeper.  As Alan Riley writes, regulatory agencies “are 
all Potemkin institutions […] the central economic role remains with the Chinese Communist 
Party”.64  With all this, as long as Leninism, and its corollary centralism,65 remain China’s 
doctrine, no Montesquian reform of any kind – like, for instance, structural separation of 
antitrust agencies from executive power – seems likely to ever change anything. 
 
A plausibly stronger objection to our claim that economic governance is broken by design is 
that the CCP is not a monolithic party.  Two schools of thought compete for leadership within 
it: the conservatives, committed to keeping the Party State in charge, and the reformists, 
supportive of market-oriented reforms and Western style governance.66  In today’s China, 
                                                 
60




 US Department of State, China Investment Climate Statement 2015, p. 5: See 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241728.pdf   
63
 On the lack of independent judicial review, see Angela Zhang, “Bureaucratic Politics in China’s Antitrust 
Enforcement”, Concurrences N°3-2015 I Conference I New Frontiers of Antitrust 2015 I Paris, 15 June 2015.  
On the division into three distinct agencies, see Hao Quian, “The Multiple Hands: Institutional Dynamics of 
China’s Competition Regime”, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, The First Five Years, (2013) supra at p. 15. 
64
 Alan Riley, Chinese Investment: The West Needs to take off its Ideological & Regulatory Blinkers. Available 
at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chinese-investment-west-needs-take-off-its-regulatory-alan-riley 
65
 Folke Dovring, Leninism – Political Economy as Pseudoscience, Praeger Publishers, 1993, pp. 105-106. 
66
 David Shambaugh, China’s Future, supra at p. 99. 
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however, the conservatives are in charge, and there is no prospect of fundamental change in 
the medium term.  Since coming to power, President Xi Jinping has relentlessly reasserted 
CCP controls over China’s institutional landscape.67  In March 2016, a Time Magazine piece 
labeled President Xi as “China’s Chairman” in its headline, noting that he had taken “personal 
control” “of everything from the economy, national security and foreign affairs to the Internet, 
the environment and maritime disputes”.68  Kennedy and Johnson note that “The CCP has 
always been in charge, but under Xi Jinping, the CCP has asserted itself and become more 
involved in the day-to-day work of governance. Xi Jinping oversees every major policy 
decision.”69 The 13th Five Year Plan, adopted in March 2016, is the first ever to have a 
chapter “dedicated to strengthening the leadership role of the CCP in society.”70   
 
 
V.  WESTERN ANTITRUST AWAKENING 
 
With all this, antitrust agencies from North America and Europe and beyond should not defer 
to the review undertaken by Chinese domestic antitrust institutions.  Given the scale of the 
CCP nomenklatura, the antitrust system can be suspected of lacking “competitive 
neutrality”.71  At the operational level, we sketch out below two modest and concrete steps 
that Western antitrust agencies should take in merger and antitrust cases involving Chinese 
firms. 
 
A.  TREAT ALL CHINESE ACQUIRERS AS PART OF A SINGLE BROAD 
SYNDICATE IN MERGER REVIEW 
 
The operation of the Chinese syndicate is a competition problem72 that justifies a 
comprehensive review beyond narrow CFIUS-style security concerns. 73  Let us envisage the 
following hypothetical M&A scenario: Chinese SOE A makes a $50 billion hostile all-cash 
offer to acquire a Western competitor, X.74  The take-over is financed with debt obtained 
under highly favorable conditions from Chinese SOE bank B and conducted via two small 
                                                 
67
 Id, p. 119. 
68
 See China’s Chairman Builds a Cult of Personality, Time Magazine, March 31, 2016, Hannah Beech. 
69
 Scott Kennedy & Christopher K. Johnson, Perfecting China, Inc. The 13th Five-Year Plan, Center for Strategic 
& International Studies, May 2016, p. 11: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/160521_Kennedy_PerfectingChinaInc_Web.pdf 
70
 Id at p. 35. These five-year plans are significant, similar to a Western political party manifesto. 
71
 See OECD, Roundtable on Competition Neutrality, Note by Nicolas Petit, Implications of Competitive 
Neutrality for Competition Agencies: a Process Perspective, DAF/COMP/WD(2015)50, June 11, 2015.  
72
 See Lin & Milhaupt supra: “The networks we describe most likely produce countervailing effects: They 
enhance efficiency by fostering information sharing, reducing opportunism through repeat play, providing high-
powered incentives, and reducing frictions in policy implementation. But they also reduce competition and 
transparency, multiply agency relationships, and soften budget constraints”. 
73
 China’s Voracious Appetite, Bloomberg Gadfly, March 21, 2016, Tara Lachapelle and Rani Molla: “China's 
Tsinghua Unisplendour did cancel a plan to make a large investment in Western Digital last month because it 
faced an investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., or CFIUS, as the agency is known”; 
Foreign Ownership in the U.S. Agricultural Sector, AgWeb, April 6, 2016 Stephanie Mercier:  “Between 1988 
and 2014, there were 2,624 notifications of foreign purchases of U.S. entities through the federal CFIUS process. 
About 12 percent of those transactions were investigated, and in only 15 cases did the President intervene to 
block the sale, although 131 other sales were withdrawn due to public concerns”. 
74
 I borrow the hypothesis from China's Looming Currency Crisis, The Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2016, 
Anne Stevenson-Yang and Kevin Dougherty: “Chinese companies are making extravagant bids for overseas 
assets such as General Electric's appliance division, the equipment maker Terex Corp., the near-dead Norwegian 
Web browser Opera, the Swiss pesticides group Syngenta, technology distributor Ingram Micro and even the 
Chicago Stock Exchange”. 
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subsidiaries C and D respectively registered in the Netherlands and Delaware.  Ahead of any 
possible notification of the transaction to regulatory authorities in the US, the EU and China, 
MOFCOM announces that it “supports” the acquisition and calls on other countries to treat 
the deal “objectively and rationally”.75  A protracted discussion takes place with antitrust 
agencies as to whether the parties’ turnover exceeds the thresholds that mandate prior 
notification.76  Moreover, the nature of the links between SOE A and two other POEs in the 
same sector (E and F) is under discussion, all three being members of the same Chinese trade 
association and having a Party cell. 
 
Legend
A – Chinese SOE acquirer
B – Chinese SOE bank
C – Subsidiary of Chinese SOE acquirer (NL)
D – Subsidiary of Chinese SOE acquirer (U.S.)
E – Chinese privately owned enterprise
F – Chinese privately owned enterprise
X – Western competitor target
Blue area indicates entities that should be included 









Subsidiary of Chinese 
SOE acquirer
(NL) C
Subsidiary of Chinese 
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(U.S.) D
Chinese privately owned 
enterprise E






With this background, let us detail our proposal.  In merger review, all Chinese SOE and POE 
acquirers with a Party cell should be viewed by antitrust regulators as part of the single 
broader syndicate that comprises all other SOEs and POEs.77 We do not restrict our proposal 
to a specific industry, because this would leave out other upstream or downstream firms 
                                                 
75
 See transcript of MOFCOM press conference of February 17, 2016, during which MOFCOM’s Shen Danyang 
commented on the ChemChina/Syngenta transaction, available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201602/20160201259396.shtml  
76
 While merger control rules in most jurisdictions are mandatorily triggered when specified turnover thresholds 
are exceeded, some jurisdictions use market share or other tests. A few countries, such as the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand have voluntary regimes but notifications are then usually advisable and/or expected if certain 
substantive bright line tests are met. 
77
 To be consistent, the approach should cover all private firms with a Party cell.  As explained by Mark Wu:  
“Each organization with more than three Communist Party members is required to form a party committee 
within the organization. This extends to not only SOEs, but also private companies and foreign firms”.   See 
Mark Wu, supra, p.20.   
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which can influence the conditions of competition within the industry (such as input suppliers, 
for example electricity, oil or raw material suppliers).  The broad syndicate will also include 
SOE banks, where financial firepower is plainly at the service of SOE acquirers.78   
 
In this scenario, Chinese SOE and POE acquirers cannot skirt mandatory merger control 
thresholds in the US and the EU by using subsidiaries that generated limited turnover as a 
front for the transaction (in our hypothetical scenario, C and D) and designating them as the 
sole acquirers of the purchased assets.  Moreover, the aggregation of all SOEs and POEs 
should reflect the true magnitude of anticompetitive overlaps during the analysis of the 
transaction.  Concretely, antitrust agencies will not only consider the aggregated market 
shares of A and X, but also include all competing SOEs and POEs with a Party cell as 
members of the Chinese supertrust (here, E and F). 
To date, US antitrust regulators have not grappled with the issue of whether a Chinese 
acquirer should be viewed as part of the broader syndicate.  In contrast, EU and Australian 
practices in relation to SOEs (but not POEs) are more established.79  In the EU, the EU 
Commission – the agency in charge of merger review – accepts the need to look beyond 
nominal shareholding and governance structures, and focuses on whether SOEs have an 
“independent power of decision”.  In the Hinkley Point decision in March 2016, the EU 
Commission considered all Chinese SOEs in the energy sector to form a single economic 
unit.80  If the EU Commission had taken the narrow view that each SOE is a distinct entity for 
antitrust purposes, it could not have reviewed the proposed joint venture since that SOE’s EU 
turnover was below the jurisdictional thresholds. 
 
To reach this finding, the EU Commission essentially referred to Chinese statutory provisions 
that grant SASAC supervisory control over SOEs.  This approach is pragmatic.  With this, the 
EU Commission is not dragged into the consideration of unverifiable defenses that SASAC 
control is not actually exercised.   
 
In our view, the US and EU agencies could equally rely on the organic existence of a CCP 
Party cell within each Chinese acquirer in order to establish the existence of a single 
economic unit. This may then entitle the EU Commission to review transactions involving 
Chinese acquirers which do not have SOE status (in our hypothesis, F acquires a European 






                                                 
78
 See for example, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28 2016, How China Inc. Plans to Pay for Biggest Overseas 
Deal, Kane Wu: http://www.wsj.com/articles/chemchina-finds-banks-eager-to-loan-billions-for-syngenta-deal-
1456650286 
79
 In 2009, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) reviewed Chinalco’s proposed 
acquisition of Rio Tinto. It listed a number of conditions and assumptions that would be necessary for a 
competition concern to arise, the third of which was that Chinalco, the Chinese government, and Chinese 
purchasers of iron ore (i.e. Chinese steel mills) would have to be considered for the purposes of the competition 
assessment as a single entity. 
80
 See Commission Decision, EDF/CGN/NNB Group of Companies, Case M.7850, March 10, 2016.  For 
comprehensive treatment and early analysis, see Alan Riley, “Nuking Misconceptions: Hinkley Point, Chinese 
SOEs and EU Merger Law (May 10, 2016) available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778229   
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C. ASSUME UNDERLYING COORDINATION SCHEME IN ANTITRUST 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
An additional concept that could be further investigated in future research is that Chinese 
firms’ anticompetitive conduct in North American and European markets should be 
investigated on the default assumption of a subjacent coordination scheme.  In my view, this 
proposition ought to be uncontroversial and should be considered nothing more than an 
adaptation of competition rules to accommodate the Chinese corporate paradigm.  Imagine 
that, post-merger, A engages in rapacious below-cost pricing in Europe or that it performs 
acts of industrial espionage.  Given the organizational structure of the syndicate – notably that 
all senior executives and management at Chinese SOEs are appointed by the CCP’s 
Organization Department– it can be presumed that the benefits of A’s predatory conduct will 
be shared with E and F, and that stolen technology will be also transferred to them and other 
members of the Chinese supertrust. 
 
And it has an important added benefit.  Indeed, a conventional threshold principle of modern 
competition law regimes is that anticompetitive unilateral conduct is only prohibited to the 
extent that the impugned firm enjoys a certain degree of market power.  Framing the case by 
default as anticompetitive coordination solves this conundrum. 
 
Here, EU competition law may offer more legal ammunition and precedential authority than 
US antitrust law.  In EU competition law, the prohibition of anticompetitive coordinated 
conduct enshrined in Article 101 TFEU has often been enforced against individual firm 
behavior, upon simple proof of a “community of interest” with other firms.  Whilst this case-
law has been restricted in the Bayer judgments following an era of wide decisional 
expansion,81 Professors Whish and Bailey suggest that Bayer has not entirely wiped away the 
applicability of Article 101 TFEU, and that this issue remains foremost a question of fact.82  
With this, it is plausible that the degree of linkage exhibited by the Chinese supertrust could 
meet the requisite legal standard demanded by EU case-law.  In addition, we observe that the 
concept of “collective dominance” under Article 102 TFEU provides another possible avenue 
to capture syndicate links.83  In Italian Flat Glass, the EU’s General Court noted:84 “there is 
nothing, in principle, to prevent two or more independent economic entities from being, on a 
specific market, united by such economic links that, by virtue of that fact, together they hold a 
dominant position vis-à-vis the other operators on the same market”.  In 2005, the EU 
Commission further noted that collective dominance could apply outside of “the existence of 
an agreement or of other links in law” and that a finding of collective dominance could “be 
based on other connecting factors and depends on an economic assessment and, in particular, 
on an assessment of the structure of the market in question”.85 
 
Moreover, EU competition law may provide more conceptual flexibility than US antitrust 
law.  As is well-known, the origins of the competition law of the European Union can be 
traced to a German XXth century ideology called “ordo-liberalism”, an intellectual current 
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 C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P, C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P, Bundersverband and Commission v Bayer AG, [2004] ECR I-
23. 
82
 R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2015 at p. 115. 
83
 N. Petit, “The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law”, in Research Handbook in European Competition 
Law, I. Liannos and D. Geradin eds., Edward Elgar, September 2013. 
84
 GC, Case T-68/89 and T-77–78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG Vernante 
Pennitalia SpA v Commission, ECR [1992] II-1403, §358. 
85
 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, 
December 2005, §46. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf 
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which advocates absolute insulation of the economy (and regulators) from politics.86  EU 
competition law thus embeds a philosophical rejection of any political involvement in free 
markets.87  Applied ordo-liberalism has led to controversial decisional initiatives in the past.  
An EU Commission decision concluded for instance that oral statements of the French 
treasury minister which sought to reassure investors in the State-owned telecom incumbent 
constituted an unlawful subsidy.88 
 
This proposition may be viewed as bold, in particular by Chinese stakeholders, but it should 
not be.  As David Stallibrass mentions, Chinese antitrust law is “substantively based on the 
law of the European Union”.89  To some extent, the distaste for political involvement should 
also already underpin Chinese domestic antitrust law. 
 
Last, let me address a possible superficial tension between the two policy proposals.  If 
Chinese firms that belong to the syndicate are treated as a single economic unit in ex-ante 
merger review, they cannot (some might argue) legally be considered to be engaged in 
coordination in ex-post antitrust proceedings, for this requires decisional independence.  But 
there is a justification for this differentiated standard.  In ex-ante merger review, more drastic 
legal doctrines that minimize the risk of non-notification may be required because it is 
impractical to unwind industry concentration ex-post.  Moreover, in EU merger control law, it 
is indisputable that firms that are otherwise independent can be deemed to belong to a “group” 
of firms for jurisdictional and substantive purposes, upon the showing of direct or indirect 




The media has reported that, after China’s Anbang took over the New York Waldorf Astoria 
in 2014, President Obama did not stay there during a 2015 visit to the UN, which had long 
been the practice, plausibly for security concerns. Anbang has deep connections to the CCP.91 
 
But going beyond such discrete, anecdotal security concerns, the US and the EU have been 
idle spectators to the gobbling-up of domestic companies by Chinese acquirers.92  Forbearance 
has been the Western world’s official doctrine vis-a-vis China.  This passive policy rests on 
several implicit, and disputable, foundations: trust in Washington consensus-style market 
institutions; leap of faith in the “growth delivers democracy” narrative; and self-censorship by 
conflicted stakeholders – including financial industry players, law firms, consultants and 
academics. 
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In this paper, I have advocated a more robust response which looks through the smokescreen 
of “Potemkin institutions” and understands that China’s corporate, economic and legal 
governance seems to apply verbatim Lenin’s precept that the entire economy should be 
organized as a syndicate. 
 
This situation raises antitrust red flags, and should prompt the regulators of North America, 
Europe and elsewhere to take two simple, pragmatic steps under merger control and antitrust 
rules.93  
 
In merger review, antitrust agencies should treat all SOEs and POEs with a Party cell as one 
unitary group and undertake a thorough competitive assessment of transactions on this basis.  
In addition, antitrust cases involving Chinese firms should be investigated on the default 
assumption that there is an underlying coordination scheme among them. 
 
This is a minimal but essential price to pay if we are to maintain public confidence in the 
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 Those adjustments are required because the operation of the Chinese supertrust is a competition problem that 
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